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Abstract 
Many companies offer their customers voluntary carbon ‘offset’ certificates to compensate 
for greenhouse gas emissions. Voluntary offset certificates are cheap because the demand 
for them is low, allowing consumers to compensate for their emissions without significant 
sacrifices. Regarding the distribution of emission reduction responsibilities I argue that 
excess emissions are permissible if they are offset properly. However, if individuals buy 
offsets only because they are cheap, they fail to be robustly motivated to choose a 
permissible course of action. This suspected lack of robust motivation raises both 
pragmatic questions about the functioning of offsetting schemes and moral questions about 
the worth of such unstable motives. The analysis provided here also has wider implications 
for the normative analysis of partial compliance and ‘many hands’ problems, especially for 
those cases where compliance levels and costs interact. 
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Abstract 
Many companies offer their customers voluntary carbon ‘offset’ certificates to compensate 
for greenhouse gas emissions. Voluntary offset certificates are cheap because the demand 
for them is low, allowing consumers to compensate for their emissions without significant 
sacrifices. Regarding the distribution of emission reduction responsibilities I argue that 
excess emissions are permissible if they are offset properly. However, if individuals buy 
offsets only because they are cheap, they fail to be robustly motivated to choose a 
permissible course of action. This suspected lack of robust motivation raises both 
pragmatic questions about the functioning of offsetting schemes and moral questions about 
the worth of such unstable motives. The analysis provided here also has wider implications 
for the normative analysis of partial compliance and ‘many hands’ problems, especially for 
those cases where compliance levels and costs interact. 
 
Recently I flew from London to Hamburg. My airline offered ‘carbon offsetting’ for 
my flight. For £2.31 I was invited to offset 175 kg of CO2 emissions ‘through UN certified 
emission reduction projects’ (Easyjet, 2012). In my case, I was informed, the money would 
be used to build a hydro-electric power plant in Ecuador to replace fossil fuel electricity 
generation. Combining flight and offsetting, my actions would allegedly have been ‘carbon 
neutral.’ Some companies even actively advertise their emission causing products by 
selling them bundled with offsets. Land Rover, for instance, ‘enables customers to offset 
their first 45,000 miles/72,000 km of driving in their new vehicle’ (Land Rover, 2012). One 
can hardly avoid the impression that offsetting is not only used to reduce emissions, but to 
market particularly carbon intensive products. This impression is reinforced by the fact that 
current voluntary offsetting schemes are so cheap that the costs are barely noticeable. 
Offsetting is even used to compensate for the emissions caused by academic conferences, 
confronting us all with the question whether we want to participate in such schemes (cf. 
Anderson, 2012). 
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The current practice of offsetting raises two questions. First, how are we to determine 
individual emission control obligations when people buy offsets? Second, how are we to 
evaluate the motives for offsetting if people only buy these products when they are cheap? 
More generally, the case of carbon offsetting also brings to light issues about the normative 
and institutional implications of partial compliance settings, especially when the level of 
compliance interacts with the compliance costs. I provide a more general outlook regarding 
these issues in the last section. 
In recent years, the market for voluntary emission offsetting schemes has grown 
rapidly. This market must not be confused with wholesale markets for emission permits 
between states or major industrial emitters (such as the UN Clean Development 
Mechanism or the EU Emission Trading System). In this paper, I focus exclusively on 
voluntary solutions for consumers to offset their emissions.  
For a first take on the problem, consider the example of F the frequent flier: F flies 
around the world to visit friends and family and causes a large quantity of greenhouse gas 
(henceforth: GHG) emissions. However, he buys voluntary emission offsets. Assume that 
these offsets are genuine offsets, causing true emission reductions equal or greater than the 
emissions of F’s flying. The offsets F buys are very cheap because very few people 
participate in the voluntary offsetting market. Has F met his obligation to keep emissions at 
a sustainable level? And does it matter that his offsets were so cheap that he can easily 
afford offsetting his air travel emissions without significant sacrifices? 
I have already hinted that the issue requires two distinct perspectives. First I ask how 
the responsibility for keeping the total emissions at a sustainable level should be 
distributed. I will argue for an Individual Limit Principle, such that (under suitable ceteris 
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paribus assumptions) individuals are only required to look after their own emissions and 
that offsets can (at least in principle) be used to stay within one’s own permissible limit. 
With this argument I will reject more demanding claims that individuals should buy the 
socially optimal level of offsets. Second, however, I will argue that the current offsetting 
practice rests on motivations that are very likely unstable. In particular, it is likely that the 
current offsetting practice is only functional because just a small minority of people 
participates in it, and that it would collapse under full compliance because individuals are 
unlikely to pay the (much higher) full compliance market price.  
The argument proceeds in six steps. In the first section I explain the function of 
voluntary carbon offsets, and the standards they must meet. Section II sketches the market 
for voluntary carbon offsets and introduces the problem of undemandingness due to partial 
compliance. This raises the question of how obligations for emission reduction ought to be 
distributed under the condition of partial compliance. Section III discusses two competing 
principles: utilitarian optimizing and Liam Murphy’s compliance condition. Section IV 
compares these two approaches with the less demanding individual limit principle. In 
section V, I test the robustness of motivations to offset and show that the problem with 
cheap voluntary carbon offsets is not that they are too cheap – the problem is rather that 
many customers probably buy cheap offsets for the wrong reasons. The last section draws 
conclusions and discusses wider implications. 
I Voluntary Carbon Offsetting 
A virtual consensus exists that the current level of greenhouse gas emissions is 
unsustainable, and is very likely to have bad if not disastrous effects on the earth’s climate. 
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The best available climate models show that a stabilization of GHG emissions on a low 
level could lead to a significant but manageable climate change, while business as usual 
scenarios predict severe changes that could possibly spin out of control (see, among many, 
IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2007). Thus, despite many uncertainties, most experts recommend 
reducing the level of emissions and stabilizing them on a sustainable level to avoid 
potentially disastrous consequences. 
The voluntary offsetting market has been developed by non-governmental 
organizations and private companies. Consumers can buy voluntary emission reductions 
(VER, not to be confused with verified or certified emission reductions) to achieve 
personal emission reduction targets. The provider of the VER invests the consumer’s 
money into a project that yields a reduction of GHG emissions, compared to a baseline 
scenario without the project. VER are typically linked to specific activities undertaken by 
the buyer, so that the customer can claim ‘carbon neutrality’1 regarding these specific 
emissions. The most frequent practice is the link between air travel and VER. Sometimes 
commercial customers or federations buy VER as well. For instance, the international 
football association (FIFA) claims that the 2006 World Cup was ‘carbon-neutral’ because it 
bought VER to offset the emissions caused by the cup (Schiermeier, 2006). 
The ethics of emission trading and carbon offsetting is a new research topic, and the 
literature is still quite limited. Influential contributions are Michael Sandel’s (1997) brief 
and fierce rejection of emission trading, and Robert Goodin’s (1994) more general 
arguments about the problem arising from ‘selling environmental indulgences’. Recently, 
Simon Caney and Cameron Hepburn (2011; cf. Caney, 2010) have offered a taxonomy of 
arguments against emission trading. Following their systematic treatment, one can 
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distinguish between the claims that (i) emission permits should not be owned in principle; 
(ii) responsibility for an emission reduction is personal and should be discharged by the 
responsibility-bearer only; (iii) emission trading harms the vulnerable; (iv) putting a price 
on the environment is wrong as such, and that (v) emission trading wrongly converts a fine 
for pollution into a fee for use. With regard to emissions trading between companies or 
states Caney and Hepburn find that none of the arguments to back up these claims provide 
decisive reasons against trading, as long as the system is implemented properly.  
For the more specific issue of voluntary emission offsetting, the permissibility of 
delegating the duty to reduce emissions is crucial. If such delegation is impermissible, all 
carbon offsetting practices are morally wrong. In discussing this claim, some authors 
propose an analogy with military conscription (Caney and Hepburn, 2011, p. 215; 
Anonymous, 2010, pp. 2080-1). If paying someone else to serve in the army is wrong, 
then, the argument goes, it is also wrong to pay someone to reduce emissions on one’s 
behalf. However, the analogy is shaky. In particular, paying someone else to serve implies 
remunerating someone to take a significant risk of injury and death. By contrast, paying 
someone for VER certificates typically imposes no particular risk and often comes with 
positive side effects for the seller.   
Philosophical literature focused specifically on voluntary emission offsets is almost 
non-existent, with the exceptions of a chapter in John Broome’s Climate Matters (Broome, 
2012, ch. 5) and a research note in the Harvard Law Review (Anonymous, 2010). Broome 
is in favour of individual offsetting. Like me, he observes that current offsetting prices are 
low due to the non-compliance of others, but, unlike me, he does not see this as a problem. 
The Harvard Law Review note is mainly based on virtue-ethical considerations, a line of 
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argument that will only play a peripheral role in what follows. 
Before tackling the normative analysis, some practical problems that arise with 
regard to emission offsetting should be mentioned (cf. Environmental Audit Committee, 
2007): 
 Lack of additionality. It is often difficult to prove that the investment is 
pivotal in bringing about the emission reductions promised because it is hard 
to assess counter-factual claims about the baseline scenario and indirect 
effects. Projects may also fail to produce the reductions promised, or the 
reductions may not be permanent. 
 Lack of standards for emission calculations. ‘Carbon calculators’ to 
determine the level of GHG emissions from activities like air travel vary 
widely in their results. (Schiermeier, 2006.) 
 Unintended side effects. Emission reduction projects can have unintended 
negative side effects, for instance, secondary environmental problems (cf. 
Kollmuss, Zink and Polycarp, 2008). 
To keep the argument simple, I bracket off all the practical problems that could arise. I 
therefore assume – optimistically – that there are genuine offsetting projects, and that 
investing into these leads to the additional emission reductions they promise without any 
negative side effects. The point of this paper is to investigate the normative questions that 
arise even if voluntary carbon offsetting works perfectly well from the implementation 
perspective. To pursue this line of inquiry, I use a set of background assumptions about 
climate justice and the moral obligations arising from climate change.  
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First, I assume that there is a maximum level of global GHG emissions that is 
permissible per year.
2
 One attempt to determine the maximum yearly permissible level is to 
conduct a large scale cost-benefit analysis of GHG emissions and determine the optimal 
level of emissions, an approach pursued by the Stern review (2007). 
Second, with a global maximum permissible level in place, one can distribute the 
responsibility to stay below this level among individuals. The simplest form of distributing 
individual emission rights is to grant an equal share of emission rights to every individual. 
However, there may be good reasons for more sophisticated, needs-based approaches. 
Again, these complications are put aside. No matter how the distribution of emission rights 
is conducted, let there be a maximum annual level of permissible emissions Li for each 
individual i. 
  
Third, in this paper I only discuss the individual emission limit Li imposed on 
individuals. I thereby bracket off the claim that people who benefit from living in countries 
with a history of high emissions have to compensate people living in countries with a 
history of low emissions. I also put to the side the (reasonable) claim that individuals have 
an immediate obligation to help those who suffer from climate change, even if everyone 
met the required emission limits.  
Fourth, I do not address any wider questions of global justice. Instead, I operate 
under the idealizing assumption that the offsetting scheme operates against a backdrop of 
equal wealth distribution. This allows me to focus on the question whether carbon 
offsetting can be defended in principle. In the less egalitarian, non-ideal reality it is likely 
that the practice of carbon offsetting unduly benefits the advantaged. However, I will not 
pursue this objection to carbon offsetting here. 
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Finally, I rely on two important ceteris paribus assumptions. First, I focus only on 
the harm done from climate change and the moral obligations arising from it. Therefore I 
do not discuss any trade-offs between different moral obligations. This is a strong 
assumption because higher GHG emissions may be permissible if they are necessary to 
pursue other important goals. Nevertheless, the assumption is useful to single out the 
problems arising from offsetting. Second, throughout the paper I assume that the decision 
to purchase flights (or consume other goods with GHG emissions) is a purely individual, 
optional but non-frivolous decision. All issues arising from social obligations to make 
certain journeys or buy certain goods are screened off. 
Consider the frequent flier F again. Assume that F is required to stay below his 
personal emission limit LF. Suppose F meets this requirement, except for his excessive air 
travel, which he pursues to visit friends and relatives. His flying causes some pleasure to 
him and his peers, but these are not decisive reasons for F to fly, compared to the potential 
harm caused by excess emissions. However, F ‘offsets’ the emissions from flying by 
buying VER. These offsets are quite cheap due to partial compliance, since most people 
violate their individual emission limit and do not buy VER to offset their excess emissions. 
As a result, the market price for VER is low, and F can easily fly as much as he likes, while 
complying with his emission limit, provided that we accept his offsets as a genuine 
compensation. How should we evaluate F’s behavior?  
II The Market for Voluntary Emission Reductions 
A well-implemented market for voluntary emission reductions helps to realize 
efficiency gains. Buyers and sellers have different emission reduction costs. For the buyer 
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of the offset, reducing emissions is expensive because the opportunity costs (for instance: 
not flying, disappointing friends, etc.) are high. For the seller, the reduction of emissions is 
cheap because she has a project at hand that yields high emission reductions at a low price.  
The supply on the VER market is determined by the set of available offsetting 
projects. Suppose that the offsetting projects are all genuine offsets that meet the 
conditions explained above. Let the schedule of abatement be an ordering of all available 
offsetting projects from the lowest to the highest marginal abatement cost (MAC). It 
determines the MAC supply curve as shown in figure 1. The x-axis shows the total amount 
of offsetting, the y-axis the marginal price. If the total demand for offsetting is low, the 
MAC is low, that means it is cheap to offset an additional unit of GHG. However, as the 
quantity of offsetting increases and the ‘low-hanging fruits’ are taken, offsetting projects 
with higher MAC have to be used. Therefore the MAC curve has a positive slope.
3
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
Consumers buy emission certificates on the VER market. Currently, the volume of 
this market is very small, compared to the overall volume of emissions. In 2010, the 
equivalent of an estimated 131 Mt of CO2 emissions was offset worldwide, compared to 
overall CO2 emissions of around 30 Gt of CO2 in 2010 (not counting other GHG like 
methane). The lion’s share of carbon offsets is bought by businesses, not by individual 
consumers (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011, pp. iv, 46).  In the UK, for example, it is estimated 
that only 1-2 percent of consumers use offsetting schemes (Environmental Audit 
Committee, 2007, p. Ev181). Within a certain price bracket, the market based on voluntary 
demand is probably quite price inelastic. People who offset are likely to do so because they 
are convinced that it is a good idea, and would do so for any relatively low price – 
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offsetting is clearly not the result of payoff maximization.
4
 However, it is also likely that 
the voluntary demand for offsets would drop quickly if offsetting was significantly more 
expensive. Therefore a plausible demand curve for voluntary offsets Dvol has a ‘kinked’ 
shape, indicating that there is inelastic demand for a certain low price range, and highly 
elastic demand for higher prices.  The demand curve intersects with the supply curve MAC 
at qvol and pvol, the market equilibrium. 
Now imagine that strict emission limits are imposed on all individuals. If one wants to 
cause excess emissions, one is therefore only allowed to do so if one offsets these 
emissions. This leads to a much higher demand for offsets, and Dfull is the kind of demand 
curve that results. The full compliance market has a much higher volume of trade (qfull) and 
a much higher price  (pfull) in equilibrium. The scenario sketched in Figure 1 suggests that 
the price pfull under full compliance is so high that it would trigger no demand in the 
voluntary market, as the maximum of Dvol is smaller than pfull. Thus, no one would offset 
voluntarily for the prices that would obtain in a full compliance market. Consequently, full 
compliance would have to be enforced. 
III Utilitarian Optimizing and the Compliance Condition 
One possible reaction to the behavior of F the frequent flier is this: 
‘What is wrong with the current practice of voluntary offsetting is that 
people do not offset enough. After all, if there is such a cheap way to abate 
GHG emissions, and if the current level of emissions is too high, then 
people ought to buy more offsets.’ 
This position refers to the ‘optimizing principle’ prominent in many versions of 
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utilitarianism (cf. Unger, 1996; Singer, 1972). In this section I contrast an application of 
the  optimizing principle to GHG offsetting with Liam Murphy’s ‘compliance condition’ 
(1993; 2000). In the next section, I will reject these two principles in favour of a  principle 
based on individual emission limits. This leads to three competing principles for assigning 
responsibility regarding voluntary emission offsetting: 
 The Optimizing Principle. Agents should buy additional GHG offsets or 
mitigate their own emissions as long as the overall utility is increased. 
 The Compliance Condition Principle. Agents should make a sacrifice in their 
GHG offsets or mitigation efforts equal to what they would have to sacrifice 
under full compliance. 
 The Individual Limit Principle. Agents should offset or mitigate their 
emissions to the extent that they ensure compliance with their own morally 
permissible emission allowance. 
The Optimizing Principle is derived from the act-utilitarian view that an agent should 
always choose an action that maximizes overall utility. Applied to the GHG offsetting case, 
assume (unrealistically) that the only way to do good with one’s wealth is to offset GHG 
emissions. Then the Optimizing Principle demands that one buys GHG offsets until the 
utility loss for oneself is at least as great as the utility gain caused by the offsets. Because 
the utility gain from mitigating climate change is likely to be high, one would have to 
invest virtually all of one’s wealth in emission reduction projects. Also, the Optimizing 
Principle implies that complying agents have to compensate for the slack left from those 
agents who do not comply. 
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Liam Murphy criticizes the Optimizing Principle because it distributes responsibility 
under partial compliance in an unfair way.
5
 His discussion is geared towards the duties of 
beneficence, not carbon offsetting, but exploring the analogies will be useful. Murphy 
argues that the problem of beneficence is different from other problems of justice because 
its demands are purely agent-neutral: ‘We could say, somewhat tendentiously, that a 
principle of beneficence is directed to agents as a group, whereas other moral principles are 
directed to agents individually.’ (Murphy, 2000, p. 75). On first sight, the obligation to 
reduce GHG emissions is agent-neutral in the same sense: to stabilize emissions on a 
sustainable level, it does not matter who emits, it only matters that the emission total is 
limited. The demand to reduce emissions seems to be addressed to all people as a group. 
This group-directed obligation poses two questions: how should the responsibility for 
meeting this obligation be distributed?; and how are individual obligations affected under 
partial compliance?  
Murphy’s answer to these questions is stated in his compliance condition: 
‘Agent-neutral principles should not under partial compliance require 
sacrifice of an agent where the total compliance effect on her, taking that 
sacrifice into account, would be worse than it would be (all other aspects 
of the situation remaining the same) under full compliance from now.’ 
(Murphy, 2000, p. 80) 
According to Murphy, demands are unfair if they exceed the demands that would be made 
on individuals under full compliance. This is the negative part of his answer. In addition, in 
his ‘principle of collective beneficence,’ he also advances the positive claim that 
individuals should optimize their actions within the limits of the compliance condition, that 
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is they should ‘do as much good as possible’ (Murphy, 2000, p. 117) up to the level of 
sacrifice under full compliance.  
Would an analogous Compliance Condition Principle for offsetting be convincing? 
According to this principle, people should make a sacrifice for offsetting (or perform own 
reductions in emissions) equal to what they would have to sacrifice under full compliance. 
Here we see that the Compliance Condition Principle can be demanding: the price for 
offsets in the VER market under full compliance would be much higher than the current 
price. Hence, in today’s situation, where only very few people offset their excess 
emissions, agents would either have to invest as much money into offsets as they would 
have to pay for offsetting their excess emissions under full compliance, or they would have 
to reduce their emissions to a permissible level. Therefore, under partial compliance people 
would have to do more than just buy cheap offsets for their own emissions.  
It is remarkable that Murphy’s original compliance condition focuses only on the 
point that we should not unduly be burdened by other people’s non-compliance. However, 
his principle cuts both ways: if we take Murphy’s theory at face value, we should also not 
unduly benefit from non-compliance. This means that our effort to reduce emissions should 
be on the level we would have to make under full compliance. With a market as discussed 
in section II, this effort is likely to be higher than the effort required under partial 
compliance. 
IV A Defense of the Individual Limit Principle 
The upshot from the previous section is that the Optimizing and Compliance 
Condition Principles demand more than the mere offsetting of one’s own excess emissions. 
- 15 - 
But is it fair to demand that people do more than neutralize the excess emissions they have 
caused themselves? Consider instead the Individual Limit Principle. That principle simply 
demands that one should keep one’s emissions below the personal permissible limit Li. It 
neither requires increased efforts to compensate for the non-compliance of others, nor any 
other considerations regarding the sacrifices that would have to be made under full 
compliance. Instead, the Individual Limit Principle takes causal responsibility as the 
relevant criterion for determining obligations, similar to the “polluter-pays principle” (e.g. 
Caney,  2005), but, unlike the latter, does not use money as the measure of obligation. In 
that sense it is closer to Shue’s demand that polluters should “clean up their own mess” 
(1999, p. 533), and the justification for such claims is often traced back to Mill’s harm 
principle (Brooks, 2012). In what follows I argue against the Optimizing and Compliance 
Condition Principle and for the Individual Limit Principle with regard to offsets. 
To show that the Optimizing and Compliance Condition Principle put unfair burdens 
on the complying agents in the offsetting case, I present a stylized example. Suppose you 
and your neighbours live around a lake. Each of you catch a certain quantity of fish from 
that lake. The level of fish caught is unsustainable in the long term, and (everything else 
equal) will lead to a collapse of the fish population in 100 years’ time. Such a collapse 
would bring great harm to those future generations who earn their livelihood by fishing and 
have no reasonable alternative to do so. There are two ways to prevent the collapse and the 
resulting harm. Either the overall fish consumption is reduced, or the lake dwellers take 
costly measures to improve the habitat and thus the reproduction of the fish. Further, let’s 
suppose that these measures to improve fecundity, such as creating spawning areas by 
planting reeds, introducing protective fences, and so on (I will call these “breeding 
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measures” from now on), do not have any negative side effects. Given the harm of 
unmitigated fish consumption affecting future generations, it is uncontested that all lake 
dwellers should either catch less fish or should bring in the described breeding measures at 
their stretch of the shore. All this information is public knowledge.
6
  
Unfortunately, you live at a low compliance lake. Your neighbours keep consuming 
fish at the unsustainable rate without taking any compensatory breeding measures. You, by 
contrast, do implement breeding measures at your part of the shore to offset for your catch 
of fish. Overall, your interaction with the lake in terms of fish consumption and breeding 
promotion is therefore sustainable, that is, your net effect on the fish population is neutral 
or positive. On the one hand, you catch fish, on the other you increase fish reproduction. 
Note that proponents of the Optimizing Principle must maintain that your obligations 
do not stop there. Since grave harms will affect future generations unless the overall net 
fish consumption becomes more sustainable, the Optimizing Principle demands measures 
from you to compensate for your neighbours’ slack. Perhaps optimizing obliges you to 
perform all possible breeding measures, not only on your stretch of the shore but in all 
communal areas as well; perhaps you should do this and refrain from eating fish, and so 
on. Overall, as an optimizer you should contribute to increasing the fish stocks as long as 
this increases utility. 
While there may be cases for which such optimizing is in order, the situation here has 
four features rendering optimizing less plausible: (i) the harm is caused by intentional 
individual actions based on relevant knowledge, (ii) it is clear who should do what to 
prevent the harm; (iii) the causal effect of the current actions can be reversed by future 
actions, and (iv) the current non-compliers are still able to prevent their causal contribution 
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to the harm (for the last two points cf. Miller, 2011, p. 237).  Put in terms of our example: 
your neighbours know what they are doing and they freely choose to do so; it is possible 
for them to compensate for current and past overconsumption by consuming less or taking 
more extensive fish breeding measures; and the neighbours who are currently non-
compliant can still become compliant and neutralise their past overuse. A case like this 
very much differs from emergency situations where there is often no clear causal 
responsibility, the precise remedial obligations are uncertain, immediate action is required 
to avert harm, and other individuals who should act are unavailable.
7
 
Let us now turn to the Compliance Condition Principle. To show that it may put 
unfair burdens on compliant agents, we need to introduce another assumption: the costs of 
the fish breeding measures increase with compliance. For the plausibility of this 
assumption we can imagine that the only supplier of such products and services (planting 
reeds, setting up protective barriers, etc.) responds to higher demand with higher prices.  
To keep things simple, suppose there are just four people (including you) living around the 
lake. Here is the price schedule for buying fish breeding tools and services: 
 
Demand (units): 1 2 3 4 
Unit price/year: £100 £200 £300 £400 
  
If everyone invests in the breeding measures, each buyer has to pay £400 per year. But 
since you live at a low compliance lake, no one else requires these services, and you end 
up paying just £100 a year due to the low demand. This means you can put your 
consumption on a sustainable footing for less money than you would have had to pay for 
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the same measures under full compliance. If we take the Compliance Condition Principle 
seriously, you ought to make a sacrifice equal to your sacrifice under full compliance. This 
means you have to spend two units of breeding measures and pay 2 x £200 for them, which 
equals the price of £400 for one unit under full compliance. But this is implausible: there is 
no reason to ask for a higher investment from the only individual who is compliant just 
because the prices are low due to the non-compliance of others.  
If your net effect on the fish population is not negative, you have complied with your 
obligations. Why? Taking your fish consumption and your breeding measures together, 
your net effect on the fish population is zero or positive, and you do not contribute to the 
harm affecting future generations of fishers. Your causal effect on the harm is equal to the 
one that would obtain if you were non-existent – removed from the lake without 
replacement. In the circumstances described by features (i) to (iv), this discharges one’s 
obligations fully, because your neighbours are equally responsible and are in a position to 
do their fair share in the future, as well as compensate for their past slack. 
Note that the market for fish breeding measures has the same structure as the market 
for VER certificates: under partial compliance the prices are lower than under full 
compliance. Therefore, if we agree that the Compliance Condition Principle does not make 
sense for the lake example, it does not make sense for the VER market either. It is 
unjustified to demand higher sacrifices from those who do buy offsets and thereby stick to 
their emission limits just because their compliance is cheaper than it would be under full 
compliance. The upshot is that under the conditions outlined above, the Individual Limit 
Principle is the right principle to determine offsetting obligations. 
A possible objection to my argument is given by Hohl and Roser (2011), who analyse 
the obligations of states to reduce GHG emissions in non-compliance situations. They 
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claim that “it is not clear why we should take full compliance as the condition under which 
our responsibility or duty all things considered is to be determined” and if other states do 
not comply, “there is an unacceptably large potential of human rights violations.” (Hohl 
and Roser, 2011, p. 481). In their view, there is at least a pro tanto argument for taking up 
the slack of other states. In response to Hohl and Roser, I want to emphasize a relevant 
difference between my analysis on the level of individuals, and their analysis on the level 
of states. Since states have long implementation lags and take decisions over much larger 
emission volumes, they need to plan emission control policies well in advance and for long 
time horizons. In those settings, conditions (iii) and (iv) stated above may not be met: 
given the time lag, a state possibly cannot wait for the non-compliers to change their ways 
if one wants to prevent harm. In those circumstances a compliant state may be obliged to 
take up the slack from a non-compliant state to prevent disaster, which would entitle the 
compliant state to receive future compensation from the non-compliers for the additional 
sacrifices.
8
 But such a setup differs significantly from the choice of individuals regarding 
VER, where the time lag between plan and implementation is minimal and volumes are 
small.
9
 
In addition, as long as there is no urgent action required to avert disaster, a more 
promising route may be supporting political processes to ensure that everyone complies 
with the emission limits. Absorbing the slack from others can be politically counter-
productive and entrenches an unjust distribution of efforts. The upshot is that the 
applicability of the Individual Limit Principle depends on the context, but in the case of 
offsetting it is the most plausible principle. 
We have seen that Murphy calls the duties of beneficence agent-neutral because they 
are directed at a group, not at specific agents. To discharge these duties it is irrelevant who 
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performs the right actions, as long as they are performed. On first sight the duties of 
emission reduction are similarly agent-neutral because it does not matter who emits and 
who mitigates emissions, as long as the total emissions are below a certain level. But in 
one crucial way emission reduction differs from beneficence: in the case of beneficence, it 
is usually unknown who has caused the suffering that needs to be alleviated. And in many 
cases, the suffering is not caused by an intentional agent at all but by natural disasters. For 
emissions, by contrast, we know who has caused the emissions. This causal responsibility 
makes a difference. It supports the case for the Individual Limit Principle against the 
Compliance Condition Principle. If we know who is causing harm, we require (at least in 
the first line) that the harming person prevents the harm or, failing that, performs remedial 
actions (cf. Miller, 2007, pp. 81-109). Asking other people who have not caused the harm 
to work towards a compensation of this harm is unjust if it is possible to hold the harming 
agents to account. 
The discussion so far has revealed serious problems with the Optimizing Principle 
and the Compliance Condition Principle. The Individual Limit Principle now looks like the 
most plausible principle to distribute responsibility for controlling emissions. But the 
attention on the distribution of responsibility is only one important aspect for assessing the 
practice of voluntary carbon offsetting. What has gone amiss in that approach is the 
question of motivation, specifically the question of motivational robustness. We know that 
offsets are currently cheap due to a very limited participation in these schemes. We also 
suspect that many people are unlikely to buy offsets if VER certificates were more 
expensive. Thus, the current practice of offsetting is motivationally unstable. This lack of 
motivational robustness matters for policy reasons, and perhaps even for the question of 
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the moral permissibility of offsets, as I am going to argue now.  
 
V A Test for Motivational Robustness 
To explore whether individuals' motivations are robust against changes in the level of 
compliance, we need to predict how individuals would behave once compliance levels rise. 
This prediction must draw on the individuals' underlying personal policies for action. I will 
call such personal policies maxims (with a nod to the methodology of Kantian ethics, but 
without any commitment to its substance, or indeed to any moral theory that aims to offer a 
test for the permissibility of maxims).  The general form of a maxim is: ‘I perform action A 
under conditions C in order to achieve goal G’. 
To test whether individuals are robustly motivated to perform a certain action (such 
as offsetting their emissions), we  consider how their maxim would fare if levels of 
compliance were increased.
10
 Conducting this thought experiment, two problems can arise: 
 
(1) Impossible Set of Actions. A level of compliance obtains for which the 
maxim prescribes performing action A, but it is impossible that the 
compliance-willing agents can all perform A. 
(2) Unstable Motivation. A level of compliance obtains such that performing 
action A is not prescribed by the maxim, because conditions C are not met 
at this compliance level. 
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Problem (1) arises if the individuals find that full compliance is impossible due to the 
circumstances. It may be that full compliance is economically, physically, or perhaps even 
logically impossible. Problem (2) arises if the maxim's conditions are sensitive to the level 
of compliance. In the case of unstable motivation, it would be possible for everyone to 
perform action A, but the maxim ceases to prescribe that action once a certain threshold of 
compliance is crossed. The individuals' motivations are therefore not robust against 
changes in the compliance level.
11
 
Applying this analytical framework to carbon offsetting, suppose, for a start, that 
people offset based on this maxim: 
 
Maxim 1: I buy carbon offsets no matter how expensive in order to neutralize my 
excess emissions. 
 
This maxim can lead to an impossible set of actions under full compliance, because 
one of these two situations can arise: 
1. There are not enough offsetting opportunities for all excess emissions, and we 
find that universal compliance with maxim 1 is impossible. 
2. The price for carbon offsets increases so much that some or all individuals 
cannot afford to buy offsets, and we find that universal compliance with 
maxim 1 is impossible. 
If one of these two problems occurs, maxim 1 will fail to work under full 
compliance. This suggests that even if people comply with maxim 1 given low compliance, 
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it would turn out that they cannot comply given high compliance. 
Perhaps maxim 1 was formulated in an overly restrictive way in the first place 
because it suggests that the level of excess emissions is fixed. Less restrictive is a maxim 
that leaves a choice between reducing emissions and offsetting them: 
 
Maxim1*: In order to comply with my emission limit, I only cause excess 
emissions if I can offset them, or, if that is impossible, I stay within my limit of 
individually permissible emissions. 
 
This conditional maxim does not lead to an impossible set of actions. Rather, maxim 
1* captures what a functional full compliance VER market should bring about: either 
people emit and pay the full compliance market price to offset their excess emissions, or 
they avoid creating the emissions in the first place. Everyone can perform one or the other 
course of action, independent from the level of compliance. The way maxim 1* is 
formulated, it is also clear that the problem of unstable motivation is ruled out. An 
individual truly committed to maxim 1* will either offset excess emissions, or avoid excess 
emissions. 
However, is it likely that maxim 1* captures the true motivation when individuals 
buy VER certificates under conditions of partial compliance? As we have learned from the 
scenario represented in figure 1, the price in an enforced full compliance market may well 
lead to zero demand in the voluntary market. Individuals who would stop buying VER 
once the price increases follow a different maxim: 
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Maxim 2: In order to neutralize my excess emissions, I buy voluntary carbon 
offsets, but only as long as these offsets are cheap. 
 
This maxim defines a much less demanding personal policy. Full compliance with 
that maxim would certainly be possible but likely lead to excess emissions without 
offsetting as soon as the VER market price rises to a certain level. Maxim 2 shows an 
unstable motivation to offset, a motivation that is not robust to increasing levels of 
compliance. People offset now, but since this motivation is contingent on the market price 
for offsets, it is fickle. The rather cumbersome formulation of maxim 2 could be replaced 
with a more pungent phrase: 
 
Maxim 2*: I offset excess emissions, but only as long as the sacrifice is small, in 
order to have a clear conscience regarding my excess emissions. 
 
Again, this maxim exhibits unstable motivation because increasing compliance with 
maxim 2* will lead to very few people performing the relevant action, that is, buy offsets 
for excess emissions. Maxims 2 and 2* show a lack of motivational robustness, as 
offsetting now depends on the level of compliance and the market price it induces. 
What can we conclude if a maxim runs into either (1) the problem of impossible sets 
of actions, or (2) into problems with unstable motivation? Take (1) first. Perhaps people are 
truly motivated by a maxim akin to 1 when they buy offsets. In that case, their motivation 
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is robust, but the maxim prescribes actions that are impossible to perform by all individuals 
under full compliance. The individuals follow a maxim that fails to provide useful 
guidance for conditions of high or full compliance. This does not necessarily suggest that 
following such a maxim is wrong. There are many perfectly defensible maxims that cannot 
be complied with by everyone at the same time. For instance, ‘I go grocery shopping on 
Tuesday night to avoid the crowds’ is a perfectly acceptable maxim, even though it cannot 
be followed by everyone, as it would (at the very least) defeat the purpose, and perhaps 
even make it impossible for all of us to physically get into the supermarket. But in the case 
of carbon offsets, the very idea is to create a workable system that can be used by 
everyone. Once we realize that this system fails to work if everyone uses that system, we 
have good reasons to be skeptical about the justificatory work such a system is supposed to 
do. For instance, claims that we can fly as much as we want (as long as we  offset) or drive 
big cars (as long as we offset) are a lot less convincing when it becomes transparent that 
there are not enough offsetting opportunities to go around for everyone. Even worse, 
offsetting is often used as a marketing argument for particularly carbon intensive products 
and services, prodding consumers to emit more GHG. This worry could only be alleviated 
if we had reasons to believe that individuals would be prepared to reduce emissions 
themselves once offset opportunities become scarce, as suggested by maxim 1*. 
The more pertinent concern is with (2), the suspected lack of stability in people's 
motivations. The current practice of offsetting is probably marred not so much by 
ambitious but impossible maxims, but rather by insufficiently strong motivations, which 
would fail to trigger the necessary sacrifices once offsetting becomes more expensive. 
Depending on one's moral background theory, one will derive different normative 
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implications from this. Broadly speaking, many Kantians and virtue theorists will argue 
that such a fickle motivation to perform the right action casts doubt on the moral worth of 
this motive-action pair, and some would argue that the action is therefore impermissible. A 
careful justification of that claim would require intricate arguments and qualifications 
beyond the remit of this paper (see, e.g., Parfit, 2011, chs. 40-45 for some of the 
difficulties). For most consequentialists, by contrast, permissibility is independent from the 
question of motivation. Nevertheless, motivational robustness has a role to play in a 
consequentialist analysis because of the expected consequences of policy measures 
implied. After all, if people are not robustly motivated to participate in offsetting schemes, 
these schemes are prone to fail once participation increases. This suggests that voluntary 
schemes are not likely to succeed once we get serious about the volumes of emissions that 
must be offset. Therefore, a consequentialist has no immediate moral concern about a lack 
of robust motivation, but will be worried about an offsetting practice that would defeat 
itself under full compliance, because of the bad consequences that such failure will bring 
about. 
All this does not suggest that some offsetting is worse than no offsetting. Any 
genuine opportunity to reduce net GHG emissions should be welcome, and partial 
compliance is often better than no compliance.
12
 The concern with the offsetting practice is 
of a different nature. It creates the mistaken impression that offsetting is all we need to 
solve the problem of GHG emissions, and it sends the misleading signal that the average 
Western lifestyle does not need to be reformed to mitigate climate change because buying a 
few cheap offsets is enough.  
Ultimately, the question whether the motivation to offset is robust or fickle is an 
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empirical question. Motivations cannot be observed directly, but there is evidence that 
price tends to have a negative impact on the demand for green energy and offsets for 
flights (Kotchen and Moore, 2007, MacKerron et al., 2008), suggesting that motivations to 
offset are not as robust as one would wish. At the same time, there is evidence that setting 
economic incentives can both diminish and increase normative motivations – it is possible, 
though perhaps not likely, that offsetting schemes lead to  ‘crowding in’ and more robust 
motivations (e.g., Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012).
13
  We cannot know for sure why 
individual people offset now and what they would do if prices increased. Nevertheless, the 
fact that offsetting schemes are used to sell gas-guzzling cars and long-haul flights suggests 
that a good deal of opportunism may be in play. 
 
VI  Conclusion and Outlook 
The practice of voluntary GHG emission offsetting is often met with suspicion. This 
suspicion is well grounded when offsetting is abused as a marketing tool to sell SUVs or 
airplane tickets. Nevertheless, offsetting should not be rejected in principle. If the 
offsetting is implemented properly it helps to control emissions in an efficient way. But 
offsetting raises worries because it is cheap due to partial compliance. Returning to the 
example from the introduction: is it really permissible that F the frequent flier travels 
around the world, as long as he buys enough cheap VER to offset the excess emissions? 
One could claim that F is not doing enough because the low market price due to partial 
compliance makes offsetting too cheap. However, this response extends F’s obligations in 
an implausible way. Offsetting only one’s own emissions is not wrong because of 
insufficient sacrifice. It would be implausible to hold people accountable for more than 
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their own emissions. Rather, the problem with offsetting under partial compliance is that 
the robustness of the motivation to offset is questionable, and this lack of robustness raises 
doubts about the motives offsetters have. The problem of offsetting under partial 
compliance is not that offsetters get a ‘cheap ride’. The problem is that we are unsure 
whether offsetters are truly committed to buy offsets if prices reach the level that would 
obtain in a full compliance equilibrium. This captures the problem with VER nicely: while 
we meet our obligation to comply with emission limits by buying cheap VER they may 
hide our lack of motivation to make more substantial sacrifices to mitigate climate change. 
The case studied here has wider implications for the normative analysis of partial 
compliance settings. The importance of such settings will grow as the increasing 
complexity of human interactions implies that morally relevant outcomes are often brought 
about (or supposed to be brought about) by many individuals together (cf. Thompson 
1980). In such situations partial compliance tends to be a problem. Partial compliance is 
challenging to analyze from a normative perspective for a variety of reasons. First, even if 
we keep the level of compliance fixed, there is disagreement about which principles are to 
determine individual obligations. Candidates range from some forms of utilitarian 
optimizing to more causally geared obligations to compensate for harm. Second, if we let 
the level of compliance vary, we find that, depending on the principle we have chosen to 
determine individual obligations, the level of compliance can influence the costs of 
meeting one's obligations. This means that the compliance or non-compliance of others can 
make it harder or easier to comply. In such settings, it is interesting to think not only about 
the world with the current level of compliance, but to study what would happen under 
different levels of compliance, and to look at the robustness against such variations. The 
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case of carbon offsetting is instructive in that regard. It is a system that works well in the 
current situation of low compliance, but is likely to collapse if compliance levels increase. 
The lack of robustness in the offsetting system matters: the system fails as an institution 
because it would be undermined by its own success. Perhaps even worse, it creates 
incentives and price signals that convey the impression that climate neutrality could be 
easy to achieve for everyone without sacrifice. 
- 30 - 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1: Demand and supply for voluntary and compulsory carbon offsets.  
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Notes 
                                                 
*
 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Warwick, the University of 
Durham, the LSE, and the Association for Legal and Social Philosophy Conference in Edinburgh 2009. The 
idea for this paper was conceived in a discussion with Steve Butterfill. I have greatly benefited from 
comments by Laura Valentini, Dawn Philips, Fabienne Peter, Matthew Clayton, Edward Page, Alex 
Voorhoeve and Katrin Flikschuh. I am very grateful for extensive comments from two anonymous referees. 
The usual disclaimer applies. 
1  
Since there are other GHG apart from CO2, the term ‘carbon neutral’ is misleading. 
Methane, for example, is another important GHG. For simplicity I assume that ‘carbon neutral’ stands for 
‘greenhouse gas neutral’. Greenhouse gas neutrality can be achieved by offsetting the same levels of all 
relevant GHG, or by calculating equivalent offsets in other gases. The standard unit for comparison are 
CO2e (equivalents). 
2  
The issue of temporal indexing is a tricky one, but for the purpose of this paper I simply 
presuppose that an annual emission limit is plausible. 
3
  Note that the slope of the MAC curve has a positive slope by definition because the 
schedule of abatement projects was ordered by MAC. However, this is a static perspective, considering 
only the currently available offsetting projects. If the supply of offsetting projects increases over time, the 
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MAC would decrease.  
4
 We can interpret the purchase of VER certificates as a voluntary contribution to the 
provision of a public good that cannot be explained in terms of monetary payoff maximization. By now 
there exists an expansive literature investigating such phenomena. Among the proposed explanations are 
“warm glow” theories of altruism, preferences for expressive actions, the desire for social approval and 
esteem, concerns about moral self-image and/or identity, the desire to comply with social norms,  and 
theories of conditional cooperation. A review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. 
5
 I am grateful to Laura Valentini for pointing out to me that the duty to offset emissions is 
not analogous to duties of beneficence. My transfer of Murphy’s discussion of the duties of beneficence to 
the issue of carbon offsets is therefore ‘with apologies’.  
6
 This example is a response to some very helpful critical comments from an anonymous referee. 
7
 Of course, a thoroughgoing orthodox act-utilitarian will be unmoved by these 
considerations. But if such an act-utilitarianism entails that causal responsibility is completely irrelevant for 
determining obligations, it leads to some rather counter-intuitive results in cases related to promises, 
intentional and targeted harm, theft, etc. 
8
 Note, however, that even though Hohl and Roser discuss a case where the setting is much 
more tilted towards obligations to take up the slack, they only claim to establish pro tanto reasons for doing 
so. 
9
 Broome (2012) proposes a different, controversial line of argument, suggesting that states ought to 
be concerned primarily with the promotion of goodness, while individuals ought to be concerned primarily 
with justice. This distinction could justify different answers for individual and state actors. 
10
 It is also possible that compliance with the relevant action increases if different agents 
follow different maxims, but for simplicity such cases are not taken into account here. 
11
 This situation can be modelled in different ways. We could assume that the underlying 
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preferences are stable  but conditional on certain facts, or we could assume that the preferences change with 
context. Both interpretations are consistent with my approach. 
12
  Partial compliance is often but not always desirable because partial compliance may be 
worthless when tipping points are reached, or when partial compliance creates incentives for non-compliant 
individuals to emit even more, as Bernward Gesang (2011, p. 175) points out. 
13
 Thanks to the anonymous referee who has pointed out this possibility. 
